

EXCERPTS FROM CHARTER REVIEW COMMISSION PERTAINING TO POLICE OVERSIGHT AND ACCOUNTABILITY

COMMISSION RECOMMENDATION

Create a Police Commission, an Independent Investigation Department, and an Office of the Inspector General

What is the recommendation?

This recommendation consists of three primary elements, the details of which follow:

- A. Create and add a Police Commission to the Charter that conducts regular (e.g. monthly) public hearings on San Jose Police Department policies, rules, practices, customs, and General Orders, as well as address the public's concerns regarding problems with the Office of the Independent Investigations Department, the Office of the Inspector General, and the San Jose Police Department. The Police Commission shall have subpoena authority and full unfettered and unredacted access to the documents contained by any City department or any employee relating to SJPD;
- B. Convert the Independent Police Auditor's Office to the Independent Investigations Department, with subpoena authority and full unfettered and unredacted access to the documents contained by any City department or any employee relating to SJPD;
- C. Create an Office of the Inspector General, with subpoena authority and full unfettered and unredacted access to the documents contained by any City department or any employee relating to SJPD, to assist the Police Oversight Commission in conducting reviews of patterns, practice, trends, systems, and policies at the Police Department.

This recommendation was passed on Thursday, November 18th, 2021 with 20 aye, 1 nay and 1 absent votes.

A. Police Commission.

1. Review, with expertise and assistance from an Inspector General's Office, and through the use of its access authority:
 - a. Training;
 - b. Patterns or practice;
 - c. Use of Force, stops/detentions, other practices;
 - d. Policies and procedures;
 - e. Supervision and management;
 - f. Hire and Fire Chief of Police alongside City Council and Mayor as described below; Appraise Chief of Police; Hire/fire/appraise the Inspector General (IG) and the Independent Investigations Department Head (IID)
 - g. Recommend SJPD Budgeting to City Council

2. Conduct regular (e.g. monthly) public hearings on Department policies, rules, practices, customs, and General Orders. The Commission shall determine which Police Department policies, rules, practices, customs, or General Orders shall be the subject of the hearing. The Commission shall be authorized to convene subcommittees to study specific topics or policies and shall ensure broad community participation in those subcommittees.

3. It shall have an investigative/monitoring function: It shall have the same level of access to San José records as the Inspector General (discussed below) and authority to issue subpoenas to compel the production of books, papers and documents and take testimony on any matter pending before it except that the Commission shall not have any authority to issue subpoenas for the purpose of investigating any City employee, including an Agency employee, who is not a police officer. If any person subpoenaed fails or refuses to appear or to produce required documents or to testify, the majority of the members of the Commission may find him in contempt, and shall have power to take proceedings on that behalf provided by the general law of the State.

4. Propose changes at its discretion or upon direction, by adoption of a resolution, of the City Council, including modifications to the Department's proposed changes, to any policy, procedure, custom, or General Order of the Department which governs use of force, use of force review boards, profiling/discrimination based on any of the protected characteristics identified by federal, state, or local law, other constitutional issues (e.g., stops, detentions, searches) or First Amendment assemblies, or which contains elements expressly listed in federal court orders or federal court settlements which pertain to the Department and are such federal court orders and settlements remain in effect. All such proposed changes and modifications shall be submitted by the Commission Chair or designee to the City Council for review, approval or rejection. If the City Council does not approve, modify and approve, or reject the Commission's proposed changes or modifications within one hundred and twenty (120) days of the Commission's vote on the proposed changes, then the Commission's proposed changes or modifications will become final.

5. Approve or reject the Department's proposed changes to all policies, procedures, customs, and General Orders of the Department which govern the topics/issues identified above.

If the Commission does not approve or reject the Department's proposed changes within one hundred and twenty (120) days of the Department's submission of the proposed changes to the Commission, the Department's proposed changes will become final. If the Commission rejects the Department's proposed changes, notice of the Commission's rejection, together with the Department's proposed changes, shall be submitted by the Commission Chair or designee to the City Council for review.

The City Council shall consider the Commission's decision within one hundred and twenty (120) days of the Commission's vote on the Department's proposed changes, and may approve or reject the decision. If the Council does not approve or reject the Commission's decision, the Commission's decision will become final.

6. Review and comment on, at its discretion, other policies, procedures, customs, and General Orders of the Department. All such comments shall be submitted to the Chief of Police. The Chief of Police shall provide a written response to the Commission upon the Commission's request.

7. Review the City of San José's proposed budget to determine whether budgetary allocations for the Department are aligned with the Department's policies, procedures, and customs. The Commission shall

conduct at least one public hearing on the Department budget per budget cycle and shall forward to the City Council any recommendations for change.

8. Require the Chief of Police, or designee, to attend Commission meetings and require the Chief of Police to submit an annual report to the Commission regarding such matters as the Commission shall require, including, but not limited to a description of Department expenditures on community priorities as identified by the Commission. The Chief of Police, or designee, shall also respond to requests made by the Commission, through the Chairperson, by a majority vote of those present. The Chief of Police, or designee, shall provide to the Commission Chair an estimate of the time required to respond to the Commission's requests.

9. Report at least once a year to the Mayor, the City Council, and to the public to the extent permissible by law, the information contained in the Chiefs report in addition to such other matters as are relevant to the functions and duties of the Commission.

10. The Police Commission has the role of recommending candidates to the City Council for the hiring of a police chief. Hiring the police chief shall involve interviews with community panels and selecting finalists to send to the City. A representative from the Police Commission shall be on the community panel, as the Commission is expected to engage with the public during the selection process. Individual Councilmembers may add candidate names for a vote so long as the community panel has had an opportunity to weigh in on the candidate. Further, the Commission has the role of appraising the police chief's performance in the form of regular performance evaluations. The police chief reports to the Police Commission. City Council may hire a police chief by a vote of their choice, majority or supermajority.

The City Council may fire the police chief without cause by a 2/3 vote, and with cause by a majority vote. The Commission may fire the police chief by a majority vote for cause, and what counts as cause shall be defined by ordinance. The Commission may not fire the police chief without cause. The City Council may block the firing of the police chief by the Commission with a 2/3 vote, within 15 days of the Commission's vote, or it becomes law. Commission shall appoint an acting chief who already works for the SJPD during the 15 days and until a new chief is hired through the hiring process.

The City Manager no longer has the role of hiring, appraising, and firing the police chief.

11. Composition of Police Commission and How They Are Selected and Removed:

Each councilmember, and the mayor, shall select one applicant for a four-year term, for a maximum of 2 terms if the applicant so desires once selected by a councilperson. Half of the initial applicant pool shall serve a two-year term so that at any given time only half the commission needs to be replaced. Former or current law enforcement, and those affiliated with law enforcement or police unions shall not be eligible to serve on the Commission. Disclosures shall be made regarding any immediate family members who are or have served as law enforcement, and immediate family members who are or were affiliated with a police union. Additionally, no city staff is eligible for this Commission. Each commissioner may create any number of subcommittees of which members of the public will be eligible to be appointed to by the commissioner who is a subcommittee lead.

Commissioners may be removed for cause, as defined by ordinance, by the City Council by a majority vote. Commissioners may not be removed for political reasons, and the elements of “cause” shall exclude politics to the extent it can.

12. Oversee and review the investigations department (discussed below) and the Office of the Inspector General (discussed below). This includes hiring and termination (with cause) of the IID and OIG agency heads. Selection shall involve interview panels with community members and organizations.

B. Create an office of the Inspector General, with subpoena authority and full unfettered and unredacted access to the documents contained by any city department or employee relating to SJPD. This includes full access to anything and everything that the police department’s Internal Affairs has, as well as all bodyworn camera footage, recordings, transcripts, data, police reports, use of force reports, stop data, police communications, disciplinary histories, force reviews, training, etc. All documents shall be unredacted to the extent permitted by current State and Federal laws.

The IG shall have the existing powers of the IPA, but with additional access and authority. Its IPA authorities should also include a role in whether a case should be sustained and in the disciplinary decisions (currently, it only provides input into whether a case should be more thoroughly investigated).

The IG shall also have access to IID (see below) materials. The IG will report directly to the police commission, outside the police department's chain of command. The office can initiate an investigation into any area. The IG is authorized to compel any SJPD employee, including the Police Chief, to submit to an IG investigation. An IG investigation can only be stopped by a majority vote of the commissioners in a public session. The IG shall have the authority to access all of SJPD’s facilities, as well as its documents, audio, and video evidence.

The Commission would direct the IG’s reviews and receive reports and recommendations from the IG. The Commission would utilize these reports and recommendations, as well as its own access, to craft policy changes and review the performance of police management. The Inspector General shall review patterns of practice, use of force, and other department wide practices, rather than individual cases.

C. Convert the IPA Office to an Independent Investigations Department (IID), with subpoena power. The IID reports directly to and can be hired/fired/appraised by the Commission. Rather than audit Internal Affairs’ investigations of complaints as the IPA currently does, IID would conduct the investigations itself. The Commission, through a subcommittee on discipline, would play a limited role in adjudicating disagreements between the Chief and IID as to whether to sustain an allegation and as to the level of discipline issued in a particular case. The Commission would also have access to all IID cases (both directly and through the Office of Inspector General). IID shall issue annual reports. IID shall have sufficient staffing based on a formula relating to caseloads/number of complaints. The IID shall have full unfettered and unredacted access to the documents contained by any city department or employee relating to SJPD. This includes full access to anything and everything that the police department’s Internal Affairs has, as well as all body-worn camera footage, recordings, transcripts, data, police reports, use of force reports, stop data, police communications, disciplinary histories, force reviews, training, etc. All documents shall be unredacted to the extent permitted by current State and Federal laws.

D. Independent counsel. The IID, the IG, and the Police Commission shall have their own attorneys (in addition to other staffing), not just the City Attorney because the City Attorney also represents the

police department, and the City as a whole, and only describes what the law is and whether a proposed action is legal or not. One or two City Attorneys shall physically work at the office of Inspector General and no longer do other work for other departments.

E. Policy Recommendation: All investigators in the SJPD Internal Affairs shall have at least 10 years of experience as a police officer or an investigator. Lessor experienced officers shall no longer investigate complaints against officers, because they then have to work as officers in the street with those whom they have investigated. This is problematic for substantiating a complaint and then having to work with the officers they have substantiated the complaint against.

What problem(s) does this recommendation address?

There is a history of policing practices, which has resulted in excessive and unnecessary force towards residents of San José ultimately causing our citizens to distrust the police. This distrust has caused concerns regarding police hiring, training, accountability, mental health awareness, and lack of basic care for the people they are sworn to protect.

San José lacks a robust police oversight structure that, in turn, lacks credibility and legitimacy among impacted communities. The oversight structure does not promote community empowerment and engagement and does not promote prevention of systemic issues or accountability of police management. It is largely reactive, focused on individual officer accountability, not fully independent, and depends upon the IPA Office itself to affirmatively engage community input.

Specifically, San Jose does not have a police inspector general with broad access to records, nor an oversight commission made up of community members interested in participating in police oversight. The cities and/or counties that have one or both of these entities include San Francisco (both), Oakland (both), Davis (commission), San Diego (commission), Orange County (IG) and Los Angeles (both), BART (both), among many others in California and the United States.

San Jose only has an outdated Independent Police Auditor model, which audits records from the San Jose police department's internal affairs, and our Independent Police Auditor has no authority to independently investigate complaints. Nor does the IPA have authority to review issues in the police department outside of specific complaints filed by members of the community. For example, the IPA cannot review patterns or trends relating to stops, responses to certain types of crimes, officer discipline, etc. (Measure G provided some limited additional access related to use of force, but those records are redacted and IPA requests must be accompanied by justification – such limits are without precedent in other jurisdictions).

Citizen groups in San Jose are interested in seeing stronger community safety oversight and would like to participate in that oversight process by being on a Commission, or one of its subcommittees, that reviews police conduct, policies, practices, training, and other aspects they deem important to modern community safety. Excluding the public in decision-making about the largest department in the City, and about the department that exercises force and control over residents, is inconsistent with procedural justice, democratic norms, and good governance. San Jose is a local outlier, different from all our neighboring big cities, and many small ones, in this regard, as other large cities involve the community in policy making and decisions over who leads the police department.

Finally, boards and commissions proliferate in San Jose, including boards and commissions with actual authority. For example, San Jose has a library commission, but not a police commission.

Policing is an exception to this widely used mechanism for public engagement and input. When the City has allowed public participation, it has fumbled in its approach, e.g., when the first iteration of the Reimagining Public Safety committee collapsed because members of the committee felt disempowered and censored by the City's attempts to control the process and thus control the potential final recommendations.

The public should have formal input into policing in light of the current state of distrust and the enormous power that police have. This power has manifested in significant uses of force, including causing serious injury, during the protests following the murder of George Floyd, but there have also been documented disparities in stops and treatment during stops in the last 5-10 years and at least one federal jury finding of an unjustified officer-involved shooting. The IPA routinely makes policy recommendations in light of deficiencies that the office identifies, and it is critical that a body oversees adoption and implementation of such changes. A supplementary IG could also utilize its access to monitor improved policies and practices.

Our BIPOC, low-income, and immigrant communities have been severely impacted by over policing and excessive use of force. Police officers' lack of understanding and approachability has caused these communities, who are already underserved, to believe that police are more prone to causing the problem than solving it. This leads to residents exhibiting fear and restlessness when interacting with the police, and this also leads to hesitancy when in situations that they should call the police. Moreover, this disconnect creates an environment where there are two entities (police and residents) who have distrust for one another, instead of acting as one whole community.

There are complaints of under policing in some neighborhoods, over policing in some neighborhoods, complaints of excessive use of force, racial profiling, different use of force depending on race, and no independent investigatory body of the policing in San José. People complain that police do not come to respond to drug houses, abandoned cars, reports of theft, reports of trespassing, and other complaints. [The District Attorney does investigate alleged criminal behavior on the part of San José police officers. This includes if an officer is accused of murder, sexual assault, sex with a minor, theft, domestic violence, and other crimes. This is not considered to be independent, investigatory oversight of San José policing.] There are complaints of officers smiling and laughing with each other after pulling residents over during traffic stops (appearing to be laughing at the person they have pulled over).

Injuries caused by the San José Police Department have cost over 26 million dollars in lawsuits since 2010. This money could have been used to fund our schools instead of being diverted to pay for police misconduct.

In prior recent years, there have been documented disparities (UTEP, 2017; City of San José, 2020: see Appendix 1, Section 3).

The lack of a permanent police commission also has a disproportionate impact on marginalized communities. While other commissions exist, the exclusion of a police commission affects BIPOC and other marginalized communities because of the disproportionate impact of policing on those communities.

Why is this particular change being recommended?

Expanded oversight will benefit all San Joséans but will have a disproportionate benefit for BIPOC community members and community members who belong to other marginalized communities, including those with disabilities, the unhoused, and the LGBTQ+ community. This is because of the historical realities of policing affecting those communities most, and the historical distrust between these communities and police.

1. Oversight can help hold the police department accountable for officers' actions.
2. Oversight bodies can help improve the quality of the department's internal investigations of alleged misconduct. **A commission can provide a community voice into that process and evaluate broader policies and systemic issues.**
3. The community at large can be reassured that discipline is being imposed when appropriate, while also increasing the transparency of the disciplinary process. Greater access than the IPA currently has is required.
4. When the oversight agency confirms a complainant's allegation(s), the complainants may feel validated.
5. Similarly, when the oversight agency exonerates the officer, the officer may feel vindicated.
6. Oversight agencies can help improve community relations by fostering **communication** between the community and police agencies. This is particularly the case where a public body provides a regular venue and has a diverse representation of the communities most impacted by policing.
7. Oversight agencies can help reduce public concern about high profile incidents.
8. Oversight agencies can help increase the public's understanding of law enforcement **policies** and procedures, and why they are a particular way.
9. Oversight agencies can improve department policies and procedures. Policy recommendations based on data and review of records can prevent issues by identifying areas of concern and subsequently offering options to improve policing. IG-type access is essential.
10. Oversight agencies can assist a jurisdiction in liability management and reduce the likelihood of costly litigation by identifying problems and proposing corrective measures before a lawsuit is filed. Access to unredacted records and data (IG model) is essential.
11. Mediation has multiple benefits to both citizens and police officers. If the oversight agency provides mediated solutions, it can help complainants feel satisfied through being able to express their concerns to the specific police officer in a neutral environment. Mediation can also help police officers better understand how their words, behaviors and attitudes can unknowingly affect public perceptions.
12. By establishing a strong, modern oversight system that reflects best practices. Public officials are provided the opportunity to demonstrate their desire for increased police accountability and the need to eliminate misconduct.

All of these potential benefits help to support the goals of **community-oriented policing, which seeks to utilize problem solving techniques to work in a cooperative effort with the community to proactively address concerns.**

This is the direction the entire nation is moving in, and most large cities on the West Coast have moved in. San Francisco, Oakland, Davis, Los Angeles, Orange County, San Diego County are all examples of oversight agencies this Commission has studied and has had the actual oversight agencies present during study sessions. San Francisco, Oakland, and Los Angeles all have a Police Commission. San Jose is an outlier with an outdated oversight model. The Commission heard from 11 speakers on the topic of police oversight.

Police oversight currently sits in Section 809 of the Charter, so any change or additional oversight requires a Charter amendment. There are only two ways that San Jose may get its police commission: through a charter change, like San Francisco did, or through a Federal consent decree and continued monitoring, as Oakland and Los Angeles did. This Charter Review Commission prefers that a police commission is created through a charter change.

What are the arguments against this proposal?

One argument against this recommendation is that some people affiliated with the police union and otherwise may say that the San José Police Department should police itself and no one in the community should interfere in police policies and practices.

Some Commissioners also suggested that the lack of input from anyone representing law enforcement provides a weak foundation for this recommendation. Neither the current police chief or police officers, past police chiefs or retired police officers, nor police chiefs or police officers from other jurisdictions were consulted in the Commission's discussion of this issue. This is in contrast to the discussion on a mayor-council form of government where a former mayor and city manager were included, along with perspectives from other cities.

The stated response to this was that this Commission was set up so that the City Council and Mayor would get the community's input on City Charter changes, not to get input from City departments. Employees of the City already have a path for voicing their opinions to City Council through the heads of their departments. This Commission is not the place for City Council to get information from its own employees. Furthermore, the Chief of Police has been sitting on Reimagining meetings when these specific recommendations were discussed, but only listened and did not give feedback. This Commission would have addressed his opinions because we monitor and coordinate with people who sit on the Reimagining Public Safety board. Finally, two Commissioners in this ad hoc subcommittee are attorneys and believed that inviting the chief would be inviting collective bargaining discussions because, in order to get buy-in, we would discuss new policies that affect the actual work of employees of the policies department, and this would trigger collective bargaining under section 3505 of the Meyers-Millias-Brown Act ([link](#)). Finally, in response to our asking the City Manager to speak on Monday, September 13, 2021, we got correspondence from Sandra Cranford of the City Manager's office rejecting the invitation and asking us to operate independently: "It is critical the Commissions deliberations and recommendations be independent and sent directly to the Mayor and Council." We understood this to mean that the Mayor and City Council want the views of the community, of non-City employees. In fact, the application for appointment to this commission asked "Do you work for the City of San Jose?" Which department?"

Should Council decide to move this recommendation forward, it will need to go to collective bargaining which will provide an opportunity for law enforcement to provide their perspective.

Proposed Charter Language

The City Attorney shall review the City Charter and recommend the removal of all portions inconsistent with this recommendation (such as Section 809), and recommend language that is consistent with this recommendation if this recommendation is moved forward by the Council.

EXCERPT FROM THE MINORITY REPORT

This Minority Report contains recommendations that were not approved by the Commission by majority vote, as well as dissenting opinions submitted by Commissioners. This section has been included to provide a full picture of the diversity of opinions expressed by Commissioners during the Commission's deliberations.

Policing, Municipal Law, Accountability & Inclusion

Charter Recommendations

Create a Police Commission, an Independent Investigation Department, and an Office of the Inspector General

Submitted by Commissioner Frank Maitzki

The Commission spent significant time on the issue of police oversight including eight presentations, over three study sessions, from professionals with police oversight experience in San Jose and other jurisdictions. Unfortunately, the perspective of law enforcement was not included in any of the Commission's deliberations. Neither the current police chief or police officers, past police chiefs or retired police officers, nor police chiefs or police officers from other jurisdictions were consulted in the Commission's discussion of this issue. This is in contrast to the discussion on a mayor-council form of government where a former mayor and city manager were included, along with perspectives from other cities. I believe this is a significant flaw in the process and does not provide an adequate foundation for any Charter amendments on this topic.

The invited speakers provided excellent information and a full menu of all known methods of police oversight. What did not occur was a discussion of the pros and cons of each method from the law enforcement perspective. Police officers put their lives on the line every day to protect all citizens of San Jose. They are also required to make split second decisions on the use of force. The perspective of the police chief and police officers is vital not only in developing an effective police oversight system, but also in building trust between the community and the police.

One of the guest speakers, an Independent Police Auditor (IPA) from another city, stated that one of the most important things an IPA needs to do is establish trust with both the community and police. In any dispute, all parties need to be included in development of an effective resolution. I am concerned that adoption of this proposal could be a step backwards in addressing community/police relations simply because the police were not included in the process.

This proposal also gives significant authority to a Commission, an unelected body, on how policing will be conducted in San Jose and by whom. It provides approval authority of department policies and procedures unless specifically rejected by the City Council. It also develops the candidate pool for police chief vacancies (but allows the Council to add candidates), and can fire the police chief with cause, unless specifically blocked by the Council with a super-majority vote. I believe this is significant over reach for a process that did not include the perspective of law enforcement. I believe this authority should remain with the City Council as implemented by the City Manager.

Although I disagree with this proposal, I am not opposed to additional police oversight. Through this process it became apparent that a significant portion of the community has lost trust with the police and

expects substantial change from the City's "reimagining police" effort. It also appears the Independent Police Auditor lacks sufficient authority for effective oversight.

The appropriate action by the Council on this topic is to receive it as information from the Charter Review Commission and include it in its "reimagining police" efforts.

EXCERPT FROM APPENDIX TWO - RESEARCH, SPEAKERS & REFERENCES

Create a Police Commission, an Independent Investigation Department, and an Office of the Inspector General

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Relevant Links

258. This is an article to the report Mark Smith mentioned the the Commission on 148 arrests (sometimes called "contempt of cop").

https://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-lapd-resisting-arrest-20180827-story.html?utm_source=dlvr.it&utm_medium=twitter

259. LOS ANGELES POLICE COMMISSION REVIEW OF ARRESTS FOR VIOLATIONS OF CALIFORNIA PENAL CODE SECTION 148(A)(1) Conducted by the OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL MARK P. SMITH Inspector General.

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260. Jennifer Eberhardt. A study finds racial disparities in police officers' use of language

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261. Some information on legal settlements following alleged police misconduct.

a. Cities Spend Millions On Police Misconduct Every Year. Here's Why It's So Difficult to Hold Departments Accountable. *FiveThirtyEight* Feb. 22, 2021

<https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/police-misconduct-costs-cities-millions-every-year-but-thats-where-the-accountability-ends/>

b. Police Settlements: How The Cost Of Misconduct Impacts Cities And Taxpayers. *National Public Radio*. Sept. 19, 2020

<https://www.npr.org/2020/09/19/914170214/police-settlements-how-the-cost-of-misconduct-impacts-cities-and-taxpayers>

c. This interactive dashboard in Chicago reflects settlements for police misconduct stopped in early 2017. Details include neighborhood, payment amount, type of interaction, type of weapon and type of misconduct.

<https://projects.chicagoreporter.com/settlements/search/cases>

d. Assembly Bill 603, currently pending in Sacramento would require municipalities, as defined, to annually post on their internet websites specified information relating to settlements and judgments resulting from allegations of improper police conduct, including, among other information, amounts paid, broken down by individual settlement and judgment, information on bonds used to finance use of force settlement and judgment payments, and premiums paid for insurance against settlements or judgments resulting from allegations of improper police conduct.

https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billTextClient.xhtml?bill_id=202120220 AB603

e. In its most recent annual report, the IPA recommended that the Police Department open an administrative investigation when an officer is named as a defendant. (see pages 60-62)

“Law enforcement accountability is a system of checks and balances aimed at ensuring that police carry out their duties properly and are held responsible if they fail to do so. Such a system strives to uphold police integrity, deter misconduct, and enhance public confidence in policing. Complaints lodged with the IPA or IA are not the only avenue for our community to voice their concerns about police conduct. Civil lawsuits in both state and federal courts also reflect allegations that officers engaged in misconduct. However, the Department currently does not have a system that initiates an administrative investigation when an SJPD officer is named in a lawsuit. We recommend that it does so in cases alleging misconduct by on-duty officers or alleging an off-duty officer engaged in misconduct under color of law. We recommend the Department explore best practices employed by other enforcement agencies in this regard. A civil suit does not result in any discipline of a police officer. Discipline can only be imposed by the Police Chief after an internal administrative investigation is complete.”

<https://www.sanjoseca.gov/home/showpublisheddocument/75181/637608196115570000>

262. Phoenix sues state over new law that undermines its long-sought police accountability office.

<https://www.azcentral.com/story/news/local/phoenix/2021/08/17/phoenix-sues-arizona-over-limiting-police-accountability-office/8172737002/>

263. Houston Has A New Deputy Inspector General For Police Accountability.

<https://www.houstonpublicmedia.org/articles/news/in-depth/2021/08/17/406167/houston-has-a-new-deputy-inspector-general-for-police-reform-heres-what-she-does/>

Activists call on San Diego Sheriff's to do more to prevent excessive force instances

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